Domain Name System (DNS)
The internet's distributed naming service, resolving names to addresses. It is unauthenticated by default, which is why DNSSEC signs records and why poisoning and tunnelling remain testable.
The Domain Name System is the distributed directory that turns names
people can remember into the addresses machines route on. A resolver walks
a hierarchy, from the root servers to the top-level domain to the domain’s
own authoritative servers, and caches what it learns for a period the
record itself specifies. It carries far more than addresses: MX records
name a domain’s mail servers, and TXT records carry the public policy
statements that SPF, DKIM and
DMARC are built on. That is why email authentication
works between parties that have never communicated: DNS is a notice board
any server in the world can read.
The security properties matter more than the packet format. Classic DNS provides no authentication of its answers, so a forged reply accepted into a cache redirects every client that trusts it, which is cache poisoning and a natural setting for a man-in-the-middle attack. DNSSEC addresses this by signing records so a resolver can verify origin and integrity, and it is worth being precise that DNSSEC authenticates, it does not encrypt. Because DNS is almost never blocked, it is also a favoured covert channel: DNS tunnelling smuggles data out inside query names, which is a case for egress monitoring.
Exam relevance: DNSSEC provides integrity and authenticity of DNS data and not confidentiality, and that distinction is a common trap. Availability questions tend to favour redundant, geographically separated authoritative servers. If a scenario describes steady outbound queries to an unfamiliar domain, consider tunnelling rather than ordinary name resolution.